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Abstract 
Over the last twenty years, the Spanish banking industry has been deeply reshaped in several respects. One of 
the features that has allowed this has been the geographic expansion of most savings banks, which have been 
expanding into other regions (different from their regions of origin) at a significant pace since 1989. Almost 
simultaneously, the Spanish economy has grown at remarkable annual rates, a growth pattern which came to 
an abrupt halt in 2008. Under these circumstances, this paper analyzes the geographic expansion patterns of 
Spanish financial institutions during the post-deregulation period. This goal extends previous analyses in two 
main ways, considering a broader set of variables affecting bank branch location, and using a quantile 
regression in order to obtain results which go beyond conditional mean models. Results indicate: (i) location 
and geographic diversification patterns vary mostly across firms and by type of firm; (ii) the evaluation of 
growth and financial development at municipal level indicates that some communities have experienced 
financial exclusion; (iii) it is difficult to establish a linear relationship to explain bank branch geographic 
diversification strategies. 
Keywords:  bank branch, financial exclusion, geographic expansion, service accessibility. 
JEL Classification: D40, L11, G21, C25. 
 
Resumen 
Durante los últimos 20 años la industria bancaria española ha sido reestructurada en varias facetas. Uno de 
las características que más ha contribuido a dicho cambio ha sido la expansión geográfica de las cajas de 
ahorros, que han ido penetrando en otros mercados (diferentes a lo que podríamos denominar sus 
“mercados naturales”) a ritmos elevados desde 1989. Prácticamente a la vez, la economía española ha venido 
creciendo a tasas también elevadas, un patrón que se detuvo abruptamente en 2008. En estas circunstancias, 
el presente trabajo analiza los patrones de expansión geográfica de las instituciones financieras españolas en 
la época de la desregulación. Este objetivo extiende análisis previos en dos direcciones, al considerar un 
conjunto de variables más amplio que pueden afectar a la localización de oficinas bancarias, y al utilizar 
regresión cuantil de cara a obtener resultados que pueden ir más allá de lo que aportan los modelos que 
resumen los resultados en efectos promedio. Los resultados indican que: (i) los patrones de localización y 
diversificación geográfica varían entre empresas pero también entre tipos de empresas; (ii) la evaluación del 
crecimiento y el desarrollo financiero a nivel municipal indica que algunas comunidades pueden haber 
experimentado exclusión financiera; (iii) es difícil establecer una relación lineal que explique las estrategias 
de diversificación geográfica. 
Palabras clave: oficina bancaria, exclusión financiera, expansión geográfica, acceso a servicios financieros. 
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Over the last few years, one of the phenomena which has contributed most to the reshaping
of the Spanish banking industry has been the geographic expansion policies adopted by many
ﬁnancial institutions in general, and savings banks in particular. These initiatives already have
a long history, and began strongly after the passing of the corresponding law in 1988,1 which
allowed savings banks to expand nationwide. Twenty years later, the structure of the Spanish
banking industry appears very different, with savings banks’ shares of total industry assets
quite close to those of commercial banks. The new territorial expansion policies adopted by
many savings banks, which have entered markets different to those in which they had been
operating before the passing of the 1988 act on branches, has been largely responsible for this
new structure.
However, the current economic and ﬁnancial crisis, which is particularly affecting many
savings banks, largely because of their important role in ﬁnancing the construction boom of
the last few years, could be calling their geographic expansion and diversiﬁcation policies into
question. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity of geographic expansion decisions across ﬁnancial
institutions has been remarkable. Yet it is difﬁcult to evaluate the impact of the expansion poli-
cies with precision unless we can evaluate what the expansion and location patterns have been
when choosing the locations for new branches. Before the post-deregulation scenario emerged,
Jack Revell (1989) predicted that a model in which savings banks competed against one other
would not be appropriate for the Spanish banking sector. He considered two major issues that
savings banks were facing in both Spain and the rest of Europe: how to raise additional capital
to meet stricter capital adequacy regulations and ﬁnance geographic expansion, and how to
meet increased competition. After examining the optimum structure of a savings bank system
in light of economies of scale and scope, analyzing the savings bank mergers that took place
in the 1990s, and discussing the functions of central savings banks and regional federations,
he presented a general model of the structure of the savings bank movement that could best
meet the increased competition. This model was not adopted by Spanish savings banks.
The literature that has been paying attention to aspects related to expansion and geographic
diversiﬁcation patterns of banking ﬁrms, despite fact that the importance of the phenomenon
is still relatively limited, even though the variety of points of view offered is a broad one. This
is partly related to the fact that the number of countries in which this type of experience has
1Real Decreto 1582/1988.
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4taken place is limited, to the point that we will only ﬁnd a parallel with the Spanish case in
the U.S., where the passing of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1984 allowed banks to branch into states
other than the state of origin of each bank. Given the importance of both the phenomenon and
the U.S. banking industry itself, the literature analyzing different aspects related to the effects
of the Riegle-Neal Act has been expanding at a moderate pace.2
In the Spanish case, despite the importance of the phenomenon and the impact that it might
have had both on the real economy and also on the ﬁnancial institutions themselves, especially
those which expanded geographically (and also on those which did not expand), the literature
is still relatively scarce. Some studies have analyzed aspects related to entry and geographic
diversiﬁcation decisions (Fuentelsaz and Gómez, 2001; Fuentelsaz et al., 2002), the multimarket
contact and strategic similarity in the context of entry decisions (Fuentelsaz and Gómez, 2006),
or how the geographic expansion decisions may be related to the phenomenon of ﬁnancial
exclusion (Bernad et al., 2008). This last line of research is related to some pernicious effects of
deregulation, which might have encouraged some ﬁrms to abandon areas with relatively low
per capita income levels. The studies by De Juan (2003, 2008) are more focused on applying
industrial economics models of branching to the case of the Spanish banking system. In De
Juan (2003) the predictions of Sutton’s (1997) independent submarkets model are tested for
the case of the Spanish retail banking market, whereas in De Juan (2008) the entry threshold
concept developed by Bresnahan et al. (1987) is used to examine how competitive conditions
varied in Spanish local banking markets in 2003.
Although the studies reviewed in the above paragraph have achieved relevant results,
which have contributed to an overall improvement in the knowledge of geographic diversiﬁ-
cation and entry in local banking markets, none of them has dealt explicitly with the question
of what the geographic or spatial determinants of bank branches are. However, understand-
ing the factors underlying the branch location decisions of banks is itself of policy interest,
especially in the current scenario of ﬁnancial crisis. As indicated by Chang et al. (1997), bank
branches tend to be unevenly distributed, an unevenness which is important to understand
because bricks-and-mortar branch presence has traditionally been relevant for bank service ac-
cessibility. The aim of this paper is therefore to elucidate the determinants and variables that
inﬂuence bank branch location in Spain. Such an analysis may help develop further insights
on relevant topics such as access to ﬁnance. As indicated by Okeahalam (2009), it would seem
that, a priori, branch location may be inﬂuenced by socioeconomic variables and, in such a case,
2A brief review can be found in Illueca et al. (2009).
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5the extent of this inﬂuence may not be known, but it should, at least, be predictable. Given the
rapid increase in the level of branching activity up to the end of the 2000s, and the potential
for forthcoming de-branching derived from the restructuring process in the Spanish savings
banks sector, it is important that the impact of branching be thoroughly understood.
The only previous contribution in which related questions are approached in the Spanish
context is that by Bernad et al. (2008), who analyze the long-term consequences of deregulation
on ﬁnancial inclusion in the Spanish banking industry. Our study extends their methods and
ﬁndings, by considering a more recent period, a much more comprehensive set of variables,
and also a more ﬂexible technique (quantile regression; see Koenker, 2001), which enables
them to perform a much more accurate analysis of ﬁnancial exclusion. By estimating condi-
tional quantile functions, it is possible to perform a more complete analysis of the stochastic re-
lationship between economic variables than that provided by classical linear regression, which
generally conﬁnes the analysis to estimation and inference about conditional mean functions.
The paper by Bernad et al. (2008) provides a review of the long-run effects on the availabil-
ity of banking services in low-income communities. As indicated by these authors and others
(Leyshon and Thrift, 1996), this topic has been widely studied in the US, but much less work
has been done in other countries. Therefore, it is relevant per se to analyze the topic in other
contexts since, as indicated by the literature on the expansion method (Casetti, 1991; Jones
and Bullen, 1994), results might depend upon context. In addition, the topic gains relevance
in those countries whose banking systems are going through deep restructuring, which cor-
responds to the particular case of Spain. Given the recent increase in the level of branching
activity, and the potential for forthcoming branching legislation at the national level, it is im-
portant that the impact of branching be thoroughly understood. These statement corresponds
to the U.S. banking industry (Evanoff, 1988), but holds easily in the case of the Spanish banking
industry.
Not only Leyshon and Thrift (1996) but also others such as Marshall (2004) and Pollard
(1996) have pointed out that (bank) deregulation and its associated phenomena (mergers, entry,
and exit) could have affected perversely the availability of banking services to certain social
groups, or to some speciﬁc geographic areas, following multiple paths. In our particular case,
despite deregulation is usually positive to foster competition, it might jeopardize the presence
of bank ofﬁces in less attractive markets, with lower levels of demand or relative income. Under
these circumstances, if we consider the existence of bank branches in a particular location as
a reasonable indicator of the availability of bank services, the effect not only of deregulation
3
6but also of a more general restructuring in the industry—such as that which is taking place in
the Spanish banking sector—could have a potential negative effect on the level of service and
commitment to some geographic areas (Bierman et al., 1995; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995).
The literature analyzing the effect of deregulation on the availability of banking services
to less-favored communities, apart from being geographically biased, with the vast majority
of studies focusing on the US case, is also mixed in terms of results. In addition, the number
of studies is relatively low, and were published a while ago. The related contributions would
include Seaver and Fraser (1979), Pollard (1996), Bierman et al. (1995), Lanzillotti and Saving
(1969), Gunther (1997), or Evanoff (1988), among others.3 Some of them will be reviewed
more carefully throughout the article, especially in the sections devoted to analyze the likely
determinants of bank branch expansion. However, as indicated by Evanoff (1988), we should
bear in mind that the existing studies on this ﬁeld are “somewhat limited, dated, and have
generated mixed results” and, therefore, “they are of limited value from a current public
policy perspective” (p.192 Evanoff, 1988).
Most of the ideas presented in the preceding paragraphs deal with ﬁnancial exclusion is-
sues. Apart from those papers handling the topic directly (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995, 1996),
there are some other contributions dealing with the issue from a point of view of European
banking (Carbó et al., 2005, 2007). These authors have been dealing with the topic carefully.
Their deﬁnition of ﬁnancial exclusion is based on Sinclair (2001), who describes it as “the in-
ability to access necessary ﬁnancial services in an appropriate form. Exclusion can come about
as a result of problems with access, conditions, prices, marketing or self-exclusion in response
to negative experiences or perceptions”. In one of their contributions, Carbó et al. (2007) in-
dicate that ﬁnancial exclusion had become more visible over the past decade. Although our
methods will not allow direct testing for ﬁnancial exclusion, they are strongly linked to this
question, which has regained importance in the current scenario of economic and ﬁnancial
crisis, where access to credit is becoming more difﬁcult for some communities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some descriptive data on the branching
patterns of Spanish banking institutions, including a subsection presenting some information
on the changing geography of Spanish bank branching. Section 3 presents the data and per-
forms the regressionanalysis using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and regressionquantiles.
3Other relevant studies on the topic would include Calem and Nakamura (1988) and Damar (2007). The former
analyzes, theoretically and empirically, the extent to which the forming of differential branch networks extends the
boundaries of competitive interaction. The latter is deals with the bank consolidation process and the number of
bank branches in the aftermath of the banking crisis in Turkey.
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7Finally, section 4 presents some conclusions.
2. Deregulation and the changing geography of the Spanish banking
2.1. A reshaped banking industry
As indicated in Figure 1, if we consider the evolution of the three types of banking institutions
in the Spanish banking sector together, i.e., commercial banks, savings banks and credit unions,
it is observed that the branching tendencies differ strongly, and are expected to differ even
more in the future. Overall, the total number of branches has increased steadily, from 31,972
by 1988 to 42,894 by 2010, which represents an average annual increase of 1.34%. The peak
had been reached earlier (in 2008 the total number of branches was 45,662), but the deep
international economic and ﬁnancial crisis has impelled many ﬁrms, especially savings banks,
to redeﬁne their expansion strategies. This tendency is very much expected to hold in the near
future, not only because of the crisis itself but also due to the effects of the passing of the
Royal Decree-Law 9/2009 of 26 June 2009, which laid the legal foundations in Spain for the
restructuring of the savings bank sector.
A closer look to Figure 1 reveals that, for some years, the increase in the total number of
branches has been impressive. For instance, between 2005 and 2007 the number of branches
increased by 8.38%, which represents almost 4,000 more branches. By contrast, in some years
the total number of branches declined moderately, for instance, between 1992 and 1993, due to
both the economic crisis and the mergers and acquisitions’ process that was affecting savings
banks, as well as in the years of the dot-com crisis.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the market shares of commercial banks, savings
banks, and credit unions, for both loans (and credits) and deposits, including both the private
and public sectors. We can distinguish a sharp change of tendencies after 2008, generally to
the detriment of savings banks. In contrast, this was the group of banks whose growth rates
increased more rapidly since 1988. For instance, as reported in Table 2, between 1998 and 2008
the volume of loans and credits issued by savings banks increased annually by at a remarkable
16.25%—although the increase was also noteworthy for commercial banks (12.60%) and, more
importantly, credit unions (15.90%). In contrast, the volume of deposits raised by each type of
banking ﬁrms during the same period (1998–2008) increased at more moderate (and similar)
rates, approximately 10%.
The discrepancy observed between the deposits raised and loans issued for savings banks
5
8Figure 1: Evolution of bank branches per type of banking ﬁrm, 1988–2010





























































9Table 1: Shares of the different bank types in the Spanish banking sec-
tor, 1988–2010
Loans and credits Deposits
1988 1998 2008 2010 1988 1998 2008 2010
Commercial banks 63.72 54.27 45.60 47.62 53.66 43.93 43.61 46.13
Savings banks 33.33 41.20 49.17 47.08 42.14 50.19 50.16 47.23
Credit unions 2.96 4.53 5.23 5.30 4.21 5.88 6.23 6.64
Source: Bank of Spain.
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10would indicate that their geographic expansion policies have been successful in terms of loans
issued, but less so in terms of deposits raised. This would be further corroborated taking into
account that the number of branches actually decreased for commercial banks since the late
1990s. In the case of credit unions, the tendencies observed are similar to those found for
savings banks, although their geographic expansion policies were much more conservative.
If we extend the analysis to the crisis’ years (2008–2010), as reported in Table 2, we also
observed different patterns for the different types of ﬁrms. Although both commercial banks
and credit unions have been able to grow in terms of loans, credits and deposits (at least in
nominal terms), the views are much more different for savings banks, whose volume of loans
issued and deposits raised actually fell between 2008 and 2010.
Taking into account the total number of branches for any of the three aggregates (com-
mercial banks, savings banks or credit unions), it is apparent that lifting the restrictions on
branching for the institutions that could not do it—savings banks and credit unions—has re-
sulted in these types of ﬁrms following very different strategies to those of commercial banks.
Indeed, the evolution of the aggregate (solid line in subﬁgure 1a) is the result of very disparate
trends for the different types of ﬁrms. In the case of savings banks (dotted line in subﬁgure 1a)
the number of branches has increased from 12,252 by 1988 to 22,649 by 2010, which represents
an average increase of 2.62% per year. The increase would be even higher if we compare 1988
to 2008 (in this case the increase would be 3.43%!) This has also led this type of ﬁrm to increase
its share of branches, as indicated in subﬁgure 1b (from 38.32% to 52.80% between 1988 and
2010 although, again, the peak of 54.90% had been reached by 2009). In the case of the credit
unions, the rise has also been quite remarkable-from 3,029 to 5,018 branches, representing a
2.66% annual increase. However, the relative importance of this type of institution is minor, as
its share of branches is still limited (11.70% in 2010).
The trends for commercial banks have been in the opposite direction. As shown in sub-
ﬁgure 1a, the number of branches has actually decreased from 16,691 to 15,227 between 1988
and 2010, representing a 0.43% annual decline. Most of the decline occurred in the ﬁrst half
of the sample period (between 1988 and 2001), which is the period when savings banks ex-
panded more aggressively. By contrast, in the second half of the period, the total number
of branches actually increased slightly, although the rise would have been higher had we ex-
cluded years 2009 and 2010. Therefore, although commercial banks and savings banks face the
same regulatory system (the remaining differences are almost entirely restricted to their type
of ownership), the opposing branching strategies could suggest that differences are stronger
6
11Table 2: Annual growth rates (loans, credits and deposits) of the different bank
types in the Spanish banking sector, 1988–2010 (%)
Loans and credits Deposits
1988–1998 1998–2008 2008–2010 1988–1998 1998–2008 2008–2010
Commercial banks 1.0865 1.1260 1.0172 1.0586 1.1006 1.0202
Savings banks 1.1239 1.1625 0.9881 1.0953 1.1013 0.9815
Credit unions 1.1461 1.1590 1.0065 1.1113 1.1071 1.0227
Source: Bank of Spain.
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12than might a priori be expected.
Therefore, according to the information reported in ﬁgure 1, the expansion strategies for
all commercial banks, savings banks and credit unions have differed sharply, especially when
comparing commercial banks with the other two groups of ﬁrms. However, there might also
have been differences within groups of ﬁrms. As indicated by Illueca et al. (2009), the rise
in the total number of savings bank branches between 1992 and 2004 was basically related
to expansion in other markets. However, it could also be corroborated that there were other
strategies, as the number of branches belonging to savings banks in their natural markets
also increased sharply. Following Illueca et al. (2009), these strategies could be deﬁned as
offensive (or aggressive) strategies and defensive strategies. They are clearly different, not only
in their implementation but also in their objectives. Defensive strategies would be adopted
by companies trying to strengthen their market share in their traditional markets. Offensive
strategies are chosen by banks attempting to increase their presence in a market in which they
could not operate before 1989. This is especially the case for savings banks. These patterns
show multiple variations, as several ﬁrms adopted mixed strategies. For instance, some large
savings banks strengthened both its position in their natural market—in order to fend off
potential entrants—and in other markets, where they expanded strongly.
The branching strategies of the different types of ﬁnancial intermediaries in Spain might
also have affected the bank market structure. The studies by Fuentelsaz and Gómez (Fuentelsaz
and Gómez, 1998, 2001, 2006) point out in this direction. As indicated in Table 1, over the 1988–
2008 period, the market shares of the three types of banking ﬁrms changed in their relative
positions. This trend holds for both sides of the balance sheet—credits and deposits. Whereas
savings banks had always been able to raise deposits using the traditional way, i.e. by setting
new branches, 2008 we can observe how the number of savings banks’ branches has increased
more than proportionally compared to the volume of their total deposits.
The literature on deregulation and the geographic expansion of ﬁnancial institutions has
also been investigating their implications for economic growth. This is a particular case of the
broader literature on the ﬁnance-growth nexus (see, for instance, the recent contributions by
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Servén, 2010). This topic has been investigated in
the U.S., as documented by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Krol and Svorny (1996), Kroszner and
Strahan (1999) or Freeman (2002), among others. For other countries, the empirical evidence
available is much scarcer. In the particular case of Spain that we are dealing with the issue has
been studied by Carbó et al. (2003) who study ﬁve large regions in Spain over 1986–98 and,
7
13using different indicators of market competition, they analyse changes in regional competition
and growth. Granger-causality tests, showing that differences in competition are not associated
with improved regional growth. More recently, Carbó-Valverde et al. (2007) have employed
dynamic causality and panel data techniques on a sample of Spanish banks during 1993–1999,
ﬁnding that at a regional level, economic growth predicted ﬁnancial deepening in this period.
The tendencies observed for the most recent years of the sample (between 2008 and 2010),
which correspond to the crisis’ years, suggest that there could be some implications for ﬁnan-
cial exclusion. The number of savings banks’ branches is decreasing steadily, and it is expected
to decrease further due to the consolidation of the savings banks’ sector. This consolidation
process has accelerated after the passing of the Royal Decree-Law 9/2009, also known as FROB
Law,4 which was unavoidable in the unfavorable economic and ﬁnancial environment that has
brought to light the negative consequences of some imbalances in the sector such as the con-
centration in the real estate development and construction sector, the dependence on wholesale
market funding, excess capacity, small average size of institutions, loss of proﬁtability, etc.
The glooming prospects for ﬁnancial exclusion are related to the fact that, as indicated
by Carbó et al. (2005, 2007), in Spain savings banks (especially through its foundations) pur-
sue objectives aimed at helping to reduce ﬁnancial exclusion. Previously to the economic
and ﬁnancial crisis, for several years not only the Confederation of Spanish savings banks
but savings banks themselves had publicly stated that an important objective for them was
to reduce ﬁnancial exclusion, offering banking products speciﬁcally designed for vulnerable
groups. These initiatives had led some authors to conclude that “Spain is probably among the
leading countries in tackling ﬁnancial exclusion via ‘private market’ means” (p.107 Carbó et al.,
2005). The intense process of savings banks’ mergers and integrations set in train by the FROB,
which is radically altering the landscape of the sector, might thwart the previous commitment
of savings banks to fend ﬁnancial exclusion.
There are two other milestones in the savings banks’ restructuring process. First, the Royal
Decree-Law 11/2010 (9 July 2010), known as Savings Bank Law, has permitted savings banks
to opt to pursue their activity through a commercial bank and, consequently, enabled them to
tap capital markets in order to strengthen their capital and improve their governance. Second,
the Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 (26 March 2011) on recapitalization initiated the last stage of the
process of savings banks’ restructuring by strengthening the Spanish ﬁnancial system.5
4In Spanish, Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria, which can be translated as the Fund for the Orderly
Restructuring of the Banking Sector.
5This objective would be achieved by setting a new capital ratio of either 8% or 10% to be met with core capital
8
14In practical terms, the restructuring process will imply a change of corporate model, with
the conversion of nearly all savings banks into commercial banks, with the ultimate aim of im-
proving their governance and recapitalization. The consequences will be more ample, includ-
ing also balance sheet write-downs, a sharp consolidation process (from 45 to 15 institutions),
reduction in capacity (between 10% and 25% of ofﬁces are expected to close, and between 12%
and 18% in staff will be reduced), new corporate model, improved governance, increase in
solvency requirements, and recapitalization. Although the aims pursued are reasonable, this
process could have negative consequences in terms of ﬁnancial exclusion, especially because of
the consolidation process, reduction in capacity, and perhaps the new corporate model—with
more professional management.
However, the emerging scenarios could be different. For instance, Damar (2007), in his
study on the restructuring plan that followed the banking crisis experienced by Turkey and
how it affected branching patterns, found that, “contrary to popular belief, mergers between
healthy institutions do not always cause a decrease in the number of branches; rather, they are
shown to increase the availability of banking services in concentrated markets” (p.2886 Damar,
2007).
2.2. The changing geography of the Spanish banking industry
The maps contained in Figures 2 and 3 report graphical information on the geographic ex-
pansion of Spanish banking ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, they contain information at provincial level
(NUTS level 3 according to European Union notation) about the distribution of branches in
Spain, not only in absolute terms (Figure 2) but also compared to the mean (Figure 3). In these
ﬁgures we compare 1992 with 2008. We have selected 1992 as the base year because, before
that, many savings banks were involved in costly mergers, preventing them from expanding
geographically until the processes were complete.
Figures 2a and 2b corroborate the aggregate results found for commercial banks shown in
Figure 1—i.e., overall, the number of commercial bank branches has decreased. However, the
geographic distribution shows that the trends have differed for the different provinces, as in
some of them the number of branches owned by commercial banks has fallen more sharply
than in others. The only cases where the number of commercial bank branches has actually
risen between 1992 and 2008 are Madrid, Álava, Almería, Málaga, Las Palmas and Tenerife. In
some of these cases the increase was virtually negligible (Álava and Tenerife), but in others it
instruments and provided for ﬁnancial support by the FROB.
9












































































































































































































































































































(f) Credit unions, 2008
40
16Figure 3: Branches per 10,000 inhabitants (NUTS level 3), Spanish banking sector, 1992 vs. 2008
Deviation from the mean[+]
Deviation from the mean[−]
(a) Commercial banks, 1992
Deviation from the mean[+]
Deviation from the mean[−]
(b) Commercial banks, 2008
Deviation from the mean[+]
Deviation from the mean[−]
(c) Savings banks, 1992
Deviation from the mean[+]
Deviation from the mean[−]
(d) Savings banks, 2008
Deviation from the mean[+]
Deviation from the mean[−]
(e) Credit unions, 1992
Deviation from the mean[+]
Deviation from the mean[−]
(f) Credit unions, 2008
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17has been remarkable (Madrid).
In the case of savings banks, the aggregate results shown in Figure 1 are also corrobo-
rated. Analogously to the case with commercial banks, there are important differences be-
tween provinces, as shown in Figures 2c and 2d. Although, on average, the number of savings
banks’ branches has not doubled, this has been the case in several provinces. The greatest
increase has occurred in Madrid, where the number of savings banks’ branches has more than
tripled (it was 969 by 1992 and 3,279 by 2008). In some other cases, the increases have also
been remarkable, especially in the south (Andalusia), east (Valencia and Murcia), north-east
(Catalonia) and the islands (both Canary and Balearic). Although this is a hypothesis that
needs to be properly tested, these are precisely the provinces where construction has boomed
most strongly. By contrast, the increases have been more moderate in the north-west (Galicia),
Navarre and the Basque Country, and Castile (both Castile-Leon and Castile-La Mancha).
Credit unions’ patterns are much different, because of their speciﬁc characteristics. Al-
though either banks or savings banks were initially present in all provinces, in the case of
credit unions there were remarkable differences between provinces, mostly because they have
traditionally been linked to particular economic sectors (especially agriculture). Therefore, in
some provinces, especially where these sectors were important, the number of branches has
increased remarkably. However, for provinces where the importance of credit unions was
minor, the number of credit union branches has increased moderately. This indicates that
the branching strategies followed by these ﬁrms could have been defensive—indeed, there are
some provinces where their presence was important in 1992 but is virtually the same in 2008,
especially those where the presence of either commercial banks or savings banks has increased
moderately.
The information in Figure 2 does not take into account not only that there are important
differences in the number of inhabitants in each province but also that the development has
also been different (Hierro and Maza, 2009, 2010). Some provinces’ populations have increased
sharply, either because of immigration of Spanish people from other areas or people from
abroad, whereas in others this has not occurred. These migratory ﬂows could be partly related
to the disparate branching patterns, although this hypothesis should be properly tested. Figure
3 shows that, when taking this information into account, the differences between 1992 and 2008
are more moderate. In addition, in the particular case of savings banks (subﬁgures 3c and 3d)
there are some regions, such as the Valencian Community (located on the east coast of Spain)
where, despite undergoing some of the most impressive increases in the number of savings
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18bank branches, the deviation from the mean is still negative.
3. On the determinants of bank branch expansion
3.1. Sample description and selected variables
According to the trends described in the preceding paragraphs, the existing heterogeneity of
branching patterns and geographic expansion strategies has been remarkable. However, the
difﬁcult circumstances that are affecting some Spanish ﬁnancial institutions since 2008, espe-
cially some savings banks,6 might suggest that not all geographic expansion strategies have
been successful. Although the likely sources of trouble cannot be conﬁned exclusively to the
territorial expansion policies, given that those ﬁrms involved in mergers and acquisition pro-
cesses are almost entirely savings banks (which are the institutions going through the deepest
difﬁculties), it is natural to wonder whether the decisions to branch were appropriate.
In this study we focus in the socio-economic variables that may have inﬂuenced the deci-
sions to expand geographically. As indicated earlier, previous literature on Spanish banking
has mostly focused on competition issues, without an explicit interest in analyzing the links
between geographic expansion and socio-economic variables. The only exception is the paper
by Bernad et al. (2008), in which the authors analyze the possible long-term consequences of
deregulation on ﬁnancial exclusion in Spain.7 We build on Bernad et al.’s work, extending
the set of determinants, uncovering a more recent period, and choosing techniques allowing a
more accurate analysis of the determinants of the response variables. In addition, we split the
results for the three types of ﬁnancial institutions: commercial banks, savings banks and credit
unions.
However, the information available at municipal level is scarce, both in terms of variables
and years. For the sake of simplicity, the study is conﬁned to year 2008. It could be extended to
previous years but then some covariates would have had to be dropped from the analysis. In
addition, the unavailability of information for many years makes it difﬁcult to consider panel
data techniques, and performing the analysis for more years would enlarge the quantity of
reported tables to unreasonable proportions.8
We examine the impact of the selected covariates on the location decisions of banking
6Since the global ﬁnancial crisis began the Bank of Spain has had to take over two savings banks, Caja Castilla-La
Mancha (March 29th, 2009) and Cajasur (May 22nd, 2010).
7Carbó-Valverde and Rodríguez-Fernández (2004) also deal with ﬁnancial exclusion issues in the Spanish bank-
ing sector, although their paper is much more focused on the ﬁnance-growth nexus. See also Carbó et al. (2003).
8These additional results are available from the authors upon request.
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19ﬁrms. As indicated by Evanoff (1988), factors inﬂuencing the level of ﬁnancial service accessi-
bility, which we proxy by the number of bank branches available, include elements inﬂuencing
consumer demand, and the degree of regulatory stringency imposed by banking authorities
(Evanoff, 1988, p.194). Thus, the dependent variable is the total number of bank branches
(proxying the demand for banking services),9 while the independent variables are related to
demographic, economic, ﬁnancial and environment indicators affecting the territorial unit be-
ing evaluated. The information used to run the regressions is at municipal level (former NUTS
level 5 in European terminology, or LAU level 2 according to the new terminology). Using a
smaller territorial unit, such as municipalities rather than provinces (NUTS level 3) or regions
(NUTS level 2), is expected to reduce the problem posed by variation in population density
characterizing some previous literature.
Our ﬁrst set of variables is related to demography, likewise Lanzillotti and Saving (1969)
and Evanoff (1988). Extending previous work by Bernad et al. (2008), we split the total popula-
tion between natives (POP_ESP) and foreign-born immigrants (POP_FOREIGN). The inclu-
sion of population stands with most previous literature. For instance, Lanzillotti and Saving
(1969) makes the number of branches depend on three sets of variables: population, density
of population, and income, according to which higher levels of population or income would
contribute to increasing the number of branches via the increased demand for bank services.
Evanoff (1988) concurs, arguing that both population and per capita income are expected to
positively impact accessibility because they directly inﬂuence the demand for bank services.
Splitting population between natives and foreign-born immigrants is related to previous lit-
erature analyzing the interactions between migration and regional income disparities, which
generated a heated debate (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Østbye and Westerlund, 2007; Shioji,
2001; Hierro and Maza, 2009, 2010). A number of recent papers have also been examining
the links between immigrant banking and ﬁnancial exclusion (Joassart-Marcelli and Stephens,
2010). However, although access to banking services is a critical issue for the economic suc-
cess of individuals and the sustainability of communities, the amount of research focusing on
immigrant communities is still relatively low.10
9We will refer to service accessibility and the existence of bank ofﬁces as synonymous. However, as indicated by
Evanoff (1988), although most studies have used either the number of ofﬁces, or population per ofﬁce as a proxy
for measuring service accessibility, we should ideally take into account time, distance, and the cost necessary to
obtain banking services as well.
10Splitting the total population between natives (POP_ESP) and foreign-born immigrants (POP_FOREIGN)
does not per se postulate that the level of service provision is affected by whether the market served is foreign or
domestic. The Spanish population has increased from less than 38 million by 1981 and less than 39 million by
1991 (ofﬁcial dates of releasing census data) to more than 46 million as of July, 2011. This suggested that, although
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20Our second set of variables is related to economic activity. By contrast with previous stud-
ies which could use a speciﬁc measure of income at municipal level (Bernad et al., 2008), we
cannot use the same variable because it is no longer available. Instead, the institution pro-
viding the information constructs a so-called “market share” variable as a weighted average
of population, number of telephone lines, cars, trucks (trucks and vans), bank branches and
retail commercial activities. We shall rule out this variable because some of its components are
already included either as dependent or independent variables. So, should we be interested in
using a speciﬁc measure of income we shall use proxies. Some variables can be considered in
these respect, such as the total number of cars (CARS) in each municipality, or other variables
such as the (average/median) cost of residential houses in each municipality. However, since
both measures are less than perfect proxies for per capita income, we ﬁnally discarded their
use. Our analysis, though, does include the other component of the VEHICLES variable (apart
from CARS), namely, the total number of vans and trucks (TRUCKS), because of their usually
strict relation to productive activities. Sectoral activities are also considered in this category
via the inclusion of industrial and construction activities (IND_CONS), commercial activities
(both wholesale, COMM_WHOLE , and retail, COMM_RETAIL), and tourism (TOURISM).
The inclusion of most of these variables is endorsed by several contributions such as Craw-
ford (1973), who considers the geographic distribution of bank branches to be related to the
expanded development of commercial activities, including the general growth of suburban
population, the increase of per capita income, the widespread use of the automobile (resulting
in greater customer mobility), or the rise in planned shopping centers (Crawford, 1973, p.353).
These trends may further contribute to the number of branches increasing much more rapidly
than population in some particular places.
The third set of covariates are ﬁnancial variables. Although a thorough examination of bank
competition issues lies beyond the aims of this paper, as indicated in the introduction there are
several contributions which have dealt with bank branching patterns and competition issues
in Spain. Some other authors have investigated the existence of rational herding in various
arenas of economic activity, including bank branching patterns. Speciﬁcally, Chang et al. (1997)
have empirically explored whether the apparent clustering of bank branches in New York City
population had been stagnant for many years until the mid 1990s, its growth rates increased hand-in-hand with the
economic surge of the last ﬁfteen years, basically due to the arrival of immigrants. Therefore, our aim is rather to
test whether some of these foreign-born communities could have been excluded from the bank branch geographic
expansion policies. The rationale for this could relate to reasons such as the higher probability of default in case of
losing the job (given their lower family ties), their generally lower salaries, or some others such as those indicated
by Joassart-Marcelli and Stephens (2010) which would include also education, legal status or English (in our case
Spanish) ability.
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21between July, 1990 and June, 1995 could be at least partially attributed to “rational herding” by
banks. Rational herding refers to situations where it is individually rational for agents/ﬁrms
to mimic the actions of others even though such mimicry can potentially lead to aggregate
outcomes that are suboptimal. In the case of bank branching patterns in Spain, which led
the number of total ofﬁces to increase proportionally higher than the GDP (especially in the
case of savings banks), this type of behavior might have also existed. We therefore consider
that the existence of the other types of ﬁnancial institution may inﬂuence the location of the
others, i.e., once savings banks were allowed to branch freely, some institutions might have
decided to locate where other ﬁnancial institutions had been settled for years. However, the
plausible explanations to explain banks’ behavior could also be related to “rival precedence”.
In the particular case of banking, Hannan and McDowell (1987) found that the adoption of
automatic teller machines by rivals increased the conditional probability that a banking ﬁrm
adopted such an innovation.
Finally, we also consider population density (DENSITY, measured as inhabitants per
square kilometer). Low population density areas might, a priori, be expected to be associ-
ated with few bank branches. However, some previous studies found that reductions in legal
restrictions on banks to expanding geographically led to enhanced accessibility of banking
services in rural areas, where bank branches are relatively sparse (Gunther, 1997). This lived
up to the promise of enhanced service accessibility in rural areas after geographic banking
liberalizations in the US.11 While some papers such as Gunther (1997), found the lifting of
geographic restrictions to be positively associated with relatively strong growth in the num-
ber of bank branches serving rural areas, others (Evanoff, 1988) found similar trends for both
metropolitan (where population density is generally high) and rural areas (where population
density is generally low). Indeed, as indicated by Evanoff (1988), the inﬂuence of the distribu-
tion of the population within the unit of observation is not obvious. On one hand, the more
concentrated the population the lower the transport costs for obtaining services i.e., more ser-
vices (branches) are demanded. On the other hand, the fewer the number of branches, the
greater the concentration population when economies exist in serving clients. Given this am-
biguity, previous studies generally found either negative or non-signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. In our
case, although previous studies applied to the Spanish banking sector have found an average
negative correlation between population density and the number of bank branches, we will re-
11However, previous literature did not ﬁnd the extent of branching permitted to be relevant in determining
service accessibility. See, for instance, Gilbert (1974), Savage and Humphrey (1979), or Seaver and Fraser (1979).
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22examine the question, given that the interpretation of results may be intricate. Table 4 provides
correlation coefﬁcients for the variables of interest.
Our data are provided by Fundació La Caixa, who publishes the Spanish Economic Year-
book (Anuario Económico de España). The data contain information on the number of branches
belonging to commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions (years 2007 and 2008) per
municipality, for towns with more than 1,000 population—which represent roughly 96% of
total population in Spain. Likewise Bernad et al. (2008), our unit of analysis is the municipality
due to the local nature of banking activities. Summary statistics on the selected variables are
reported in Table 3.
3.2. Empirical ﬁndings
3.2.1. Ordinary-least-squares results
The model to be estimated using OLS is:
log(BRANCHES) = β0 + β1log(POP_ESP) + β2log(POP_FOREIGN) + β3UNEMPLOY
+ β4log(TRUCKS)+ β5log(IND_CONS) + β6log(COMM_WHOLE)
+ β7log(COMMRETAIL) + β8log(TOURISM)+ β9log(DENSITY) + ε (1)
where each coefﬁcient refers to the variables described in section 3, and ε is the error term,
assumed to be normally distributed. Results are reported separately for all banking ﬁrms,
commercial banks and savings banks in the different columns of Table 5. All estimations have
been performed for year 2008. However, in order to take into account the rival precedence
hypothesis, Models 2, 3 and 4 include the lagged number of branches of the different types of
banking ﬁrms among the selected of covariates (one period-lag, i.e., year 2007 information).
This strategy follows some of the ideas by Hannan and McDowell (1987), whose study on the
adoption of automatic teller machines by banks included information on their adoption by
rivals in the previous year (t − 1). This and related pieces of information aim to capture the
degree to which a ﬁrm has been preceded in the market.
The demographic variables, both POP_ESP and POP_FOREIGN, are mostly signiﬁcant
throughout at the one-percent signiﬁcance levels and have the expected (average) signs. The
impact of the native population (POP_ESP) on the number of bank ofﬁces of the average mu-
nicipality is positive and signiﬁcant regardless of the type of ﬁrm considered—commercial
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23Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest, 2008
Variable Mean Median Std.dev. 1st quartile 3rd quartile Maximum Minimum
Socioeconomic
variables
POP_ESP 36,476.75 3,272.00 279,553.99 1,684.50 8,479.50 7,578,941.00 349.00
POP_FOREIGN 4,727.86 241.00 43,189.81 79.00 819.25 1,103,790.00 0.00
UNEMPLOYa 4.67 4.30 2.02 3.30 5.70 17.20 0.70
TRUCKS 4,541.31 527.00 34,326.85 274.00 1,249.25 894,689.00 5.00
IND_CONSb 698.91 81.00 5,392.43 40.00 197.25 160,673.00 0.00
COMM_WHOLEc 172.73 12.50 1,375.21 5.00 37.00 35,654.00 0.00
COMM_RETAILd 884.38 63.00 6,603.69 28.00 212.25 178,431 0.00
TOURISMe 89.64 1.00 792.54 0.00 5.00 18,501.00 0.00
DENSITYf 40.08 4.00 312.50 2.00 8.00 8,103.00 0.00
Financial variablesg
BRANCHES 394.34 68.49 1,311.58 27.73 233.76 22,193.00 0.00
BANKS 13.99 1.00 110.67 0.00 4.00 2,585.00 0.00
SAVINGS 21.81 2.00 182.12 1.00 4.00 5,561.00 0.00
UNIONS 4.28 1.00 33.81 0.00 1.00 1,129.00 0.00
Source: Spanish Economic Yearbook (Anuario Económico de España, La Caixa Foundation).
a In percentage.
b Number of industrial activities, including construction.
c Number of wholesale commercial activities. It is a fair proxy for the number of wholesale commercial businesses.
d Number of retail commercial activities, which is equivalent to the number of retail commercial licenses. It is a fair proxy for the
number of retail commercial businesses.
e Relative index of the touristic importance of each municipality.
f Inhabitants/km2.
g Number of branches.
3
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24Table 4: Correlation coefﬁcients (Pearson) among the variables of interest, 2008
POP_ESP POP_FOREIGN UNEMPLOY TRUCKS IND_CONS COMM_WHOLE COMM_RETAIL TOURISM DENSITY
POP_ESP 1.0000 0.9215 0.0366 0.9880 0.9677 0.9859 0.9943 0.8262 0.0610
POP_FOREIGN 0.9215 1.0000 0.0127 0.9368 0.9416 0.9544 0.9185 0.8241 0.0700
UNEMPLOY 0.0366 0.0127 1.0000 0.0365 0.0173 0.0303 0.0376 0.0383 0.0729
TRUCKS 0.9880 0.9368 0.0365 1.0000 0.9650 0.9789 0.9872 0.8558 0.0401
IND_CONS 0.9677 0.9416 0.0173 0.9650 1.0000 0.9839 0.9745 0.7992 0.0513
COMM_WHOLE 0.9859 0.9544 0.0303 0.9789 0.9839 1.0000 0.9847 0.8277 0.0704
COMM_RETAIL 0.9943 0.9185 0.0376 0.9872 0.9745 0.9847 1.0000 0.8429 0.0630
TOURISM 0.8262 0.8241 0.0383 0.8558 0.7992 0.8277 0.8429 1.0000 0.0637
DENSITY 0.0610 0.0700 0.0729 0.0401 0.0513 0.0704 0.0630 0.0637 1.0000
3
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25Table 5: Determinants of bank branch location, all banking ﬁrms, 2008 (information at LAU
level 2, formerly NUTS level 5)














(Intercept) −2.873∗∗∗ −1.760∗∗∗ −2.344∗∗∗ −1.499∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.117) (0.104) (0.152)
POP_ESP 0.397∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.031)
POP_FOREIGN 0.075∗∗∗ 0.007 0.051∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
UNEMPLOY −0.020∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
TRUCKS −0.037 −0.159∗∗∗ 0.021 0.140∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.027)
IND_CONS 0.102∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024)
COMM_WHOLE 0.018 0.051∗∗∗ −0.028∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.017)
COMM_RETAIL 0.217∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ −0.033∗ −0.047∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021)
TOURISM 0.073∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
DENSITY −0.063∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗







R2 0.908 0.882 0.889 0.612
¯ R2 0.908 0.882 0.889 0.611
F 3,635.739 2,253.129 2,422.479 474.895
N 3,324 3,324 3,324 3,324
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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26bank (Model 2) or savings bank (Model 3). If we also include credit unions, which are con-
sidered in the regression corresponding to Model 4, the sign and signiﬁcance of the impact is
mostly maintained.
The ﬁnancial integration of immigrants into mainstream banks can be partly assessed via
the POP_FOREIGN variable, whose sign is also positive and signiﬁcant throughout for all
banking ﬁrms (Model 1) and savings banks (Model 3), but not for commercial banks (Model 2),
in the case of which signiﬁcance is entirely lost. In addition, the magnitude of the coefﬁcients
is much larger for savings banks (Model 3) than for commercial banks (Model 2). As indicated
by Joassart-Marcelli and Stephens (2010), the processes leading to ﬁnancial exclusion are much
more complex, but our results suggest that savings banks (and also credit unions, which are
included in Model 4) contribute more to the ﬁnancial inclusion of foreign-born immigrants
than commercial banks, reinforcing and extending previous results from Bernad et al. (2008),
where population was not split between natives and foreign-born immigrants.
The set of economic performance variables includes unemployment (UNEMPLOY). Given
its generally high negative correlation with per capita income, and, given that previous studies
analyzing the impact of per capita income on service accessibility have found the expected
positive signs (Evanoff, 1988), UNEMPLOY is signiﬁcant and negative when considering all
banking ﬁrms (Model 1), in line with previous ﬁndings in the literature. However, in the case
of savings banks the impact is not only lower but also non-signiﬁcant (Model 3), endorsing
previous results from Bernad et al. (2008), who indicated that this type of banks clearly alters
the geography of ﬁnancial exclusion. Therefore, the restructuring process which are now
affecting the Spanish savings banks’ industry could might have a dark side given the (still)
relevant role of these ﬁrms for ﬁnancial inclusion.
The economic activity variables, including the number of trucks (TRUCKS), industrial
and commercial activities (IND_CONS), commercial activities (both wholesale and retail,
COMM_WHOLE and COMM_RETAIL), and tourism (TOURISM) have different signs and
signiﬁcance for the different ﬁnancial institutions considered. In general, IND_CONS,
COMM_RETAIL and TOURISM are positive and signiﬁcantly related to the total number
of bank branches, regardless of the type of institution considered, as one might reasonably
expect (Model 1).
Wholesale commercial activities (COMM_WHOLE) have also a positive and signiﬁcant
impact for commercial banks (Model 1 in Table 5). This ﬁnding stands with the traditional
stronger linkages observed between commercial banks and private ﬁrms, whereas savings
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27banks have traditionally had stronger ties with families and regional and local governments,
and government’s dependent institutions. Although industrial and construction activities
(IND_CONS) cannot be broken down, their signiﬁcance and positive signs, for both com-
mercial (Model 2) and savings banks (Model 3), might indicate that both types of banks have
been feeding the housing boom affecting Spain until late 2007.
Regarding TRUCKS, its sign and signiﬁcance are unclear for all banking ﬁrms (Table 5,
Model 1) due to the opposite patterns for commercial (Model 2) and savings banks (Model 3).
For commercial banks the impact is negative and signiﬁcant reﬂecting their lack of presence
in rural areas (where this type of vehicles abound, given this category also includes vans and
tractors), whereas, in the case of credit unions (Table 5, Model 4), the impact is strongly positive
and signiﬁcant, showing the opposite pattern.
The environmental variable, DENSITY (in our case, number of inhabitants per square
kilometer) is negative throughout, for all models (types of ﬁrms) considered. It therefore
corroborates previous ﬁndings for the Spanish case (Bernad et al., 2008). The comparison
with the US case is more intricate because the corresponding literature is larger, and different
studies have used alternative measures of population distribution (density). Even though, the
coefﬁcients obtained have been generally either negative—like us—or not signiﬁcant (Evanoff,
1988).
The rival precedence hypothesis (Hannan and McDowell, 1987) is partly tested by in-
cluding the number of branches corresponding to the other types of institutions among the
regressors—they were therefore included only in Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 5. All variables
are positive and signiﬁcant for all types of ﬁrms. Although properly testing for the existence of
rival precedence behavior would require a more thorough analysis, our ﬁndings suggests that,
although the variables determining the location of bank branches do not coincide between the
types of bank, the location decisions are not speciﬁc for each type of banking ﬁrm. This is es-
pecially apparent between commercial banks and savings banks. In the case of credit unions,
the comparison with commercial banks suggests that some complementarities might exist.12
3.3. Evaluating the determinants of geographic expansion using regression quantiles
As indicated by Cade and Noon (2003), quantile regression(Koenker and Bassett,1978; Koenker,
2001, 2005) is a way to estimate the conditional quantiles of a response variable distribution (in
12A related hypothesis is the “rational herding” behavior referred to by Chang et al. (1997). Although tests for
this alternative hypothesis bear similarities with testing for rival precedence, we consider the latter theory reﬂects
more closely the behavior of Spanish banking ﬁrms. We thank a referee for this suggestion.
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28our case, the number of bank branches in each municipality) in a linear model that provides a
more complete view of possible causal relationships between variables in economic processes.
In a number of instances, estimation of linear models by quantile regression may be prefer-
able for a wide variety of reasons. The linear models speciﬁed in the previous section, which
are common across economic empirical studies, provide information on average impacts, i.e.,
the average impact for the average municipality. Therefore, the researcher can only conclude
whether this mean effect of a covariate on a response variable is signiﬁcant or not. However,
there is no reason why the impact should be the same over the entire conditional distribution
(Coad and Hölzl, 2009). For instance, as indicated by Cunningham (2003), the determinants
of growth for developed and developing countries—i.e., the tails of the distribution of the re-
sponse variable-can differ remarkably. Rioja and Valev (2004a,b) deal with the links between
ﬁnancial development and economic growth from similar perspectives.
Quantile regression makes it possible to approach these and related issues with precision.
Applications are growing in a variety of ﬁelds (see, for instance, the survey by Buchinsky,
1998), but they are still largely outnumbered by those using linear models which focus ex-
clusively on average behavior, although this is, of course, a relevant approach. Therefore, as
its own name suggests, quantile regression does not conﬁne the analysis to regression against
averages (and hence it is not limited in its explanatory values) but rather also uses information
obtained from the underlying distribution of the dependent variable.
The advantages of quantile regression with respect to OLS are more apparent if we con-
sider that, for a given a set of covariates, the linear regression models specify the conditional-
mean function, whereas quantile regression models specify the conditional-quantile function.
In practical terms, this implies that whereas OLS focuses on modeling the conditional mean of
a response variable without accounting for the full conditional distribution properties of the
response variable, the quantile regression model facilitates analysis of the conditional distri-
butional properties of the response variable. In addition, both OLS and quantile regression
models differ on their assumptions about the error terms. Social sciences are usually plagued
with “nonstandard” conditions such as non-normal or heteroskedastic data. Non-ﬁnancial
data such as (conditional) income distribution are seldom normal—rather, they are bi-modal,
as shown by Quah (1996). Financial or management data such as the dispersion of the an-
nual compensation of chief executive ofﬁcers tends to increase with ﬁrm size, an indicator of
heteroskedasticity.
In this and related scenarios quantile regression might be more appropriate, no only be-
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29cause it relaxes important assumptions for linear models such as those referred to above but
also because of offering a much broader view than classical regression, as it takes also into ac-
count the effect of the explanatory variables on the (central and noncentral) location, scale,
and shape of the distribution of the response variable. In contrast, the conditional-mean
framework, when summarizing the response for ﬁxed values of predictor variables cannot
be readily extended to noncentral locations—where the interests of social science often re-
side. These and related ideas gained popularity since the seminal contribution of (Bassett and
Koenker, 1978; Koenker, 2005), but the underlying thoughts go back to 1760 when the Croat-
ian Jesuit Rudjer Josip Boscovich went to London for computational advice for his method of
median regression—which was ultimately unsuccessful until relatively recent times. However,
as stated by Hao and Naiman (2007), conditional-mean modeling has been applied widely in
the social sciences (particularly in the past half century), and regression modeling of the rela-
tionship between a continuous response and covariates via OLS is now conceived as a crucial
tool.
Finally, quantile regression goes beyond location and scale effects of the covariates on
the response, asking how changes in the predictors might affect the underlying shape of the
distribution of the response variable (Hao and Naiman, 2007). Much social science research
focuses on social stratiﬁcation and inequality, which are close areas to ﬁnancial exclusion, that
require a detailed analysis of the properties of a distribution. Given that central location, scale,
skewness, and other higher-order properties characterize a distribution, it is easily inferred
that conditional-mean models are ill-equipped to characterize the links between a response
distribution and the covariates.
In our particular case, one of the most important advantages of quantile regression is that
it enables to considering the entire distribution of bank branch locations, either for all banking
ﬁrms or for the three types of ﬁrms separately. As indicated by Coad and Hölzl (2009), quantile
regressionis able to provide a more complete story of the relationship between variables—in our
case, between bank branch location and the relevant covariates. We can therefore speciﬁcally
investigate whether, for municipalities where the number of bank branches is low (correspond-
ing to the lower tail of the distribution, or to the lower quantiles), the sign and signiﬁcance of
the determinants is the same as for other municipalities where the number of bank branches
is high (those lying in the higher tails of the distribution, and corresponding to the highest
quantiles).
Under such circumstances, we would be able to design speciﬁc policies for those municipal-
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30ities where access to ﬁnancial services is more difﬁcult in terms of number of bank branches.
Therefore, in the present study we think that both over- and under-branched municipalities
(especially the latter) are of interest in their own right—we do not want them to consider
as outliers—and quantile regression allows us to analyze them in greater detail. In addi-
tion to this, as indicated by Coad and Hölzl (2009), we know that the standard least-squares
assumption of normally distributed errors does not hold for our data because the location pat-
terns follow a fat-tailed distribution—see ﬁgure . However, as indicated by Buchinsky (1998),
while standard regression estimators are not robust to departures from normality, the quan-
tile regression estimator is characteristically robust to outliers on the dependent variable, as
indicated earlier. As stated above as well, quantile regression also relaxes the restrictive as-
sumption that error terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution
and, avoiding this assumption will enable to analyze differences in the relationship between
the endogenous and exogenous variables at different points of the conditional distribution of
the dependent variable.
In some particular ﬁelds these instruments can be particularly important. For instance,
they are related to the issue of parameter variability and the expansion method developed
by Casetti (1972) and his followers (Foster, 1991; Eldridge and Jones, 1991; Jones, 1992; Jones
and Bullen, 1994), a modeling strategy which takes into account contextual variation of pa-
rameters and functional forms. Casetti (1972) expanded the traditional econometric model to
include a set of equations that would relate the parameters of the regression equation to cross-
sectional spatial characteristics (Kochanowski, 1990). Although the discussion of this issue has
evolved signiﬁcantly and the state of the art now centers on geographically weighted regres-
sion (Fotheringham et al., 2002), the underlying ideas are still valid and strongly related to our
research questions. Indeed, some recent papers such as Basile and Girardi (2010), who test
(and reject) the assumption of parameter homogeneity across geographic units in the particu-
lar context of risk sharing measurement. Likewise, quantile regression allows testing whether
the differences in both the magnitude and sign of the estimated coefﬁcients for the different
quantiles are signiﬁcant or not.
Compared with respect the basic ordinary-least-squares model speciﬁed in Equation (1),
the regression quantiles we use in this section specify the τth quantile of the conditional dis-
tribution of yi given x as a linear function of the covariates. As described by Koenker and
Bassett (1978), and in much greater detail in Koenker (2005), the estimation is carried out by
20




τ|yi − x′β| + ∑
i∈{i:yi<x′β}
(1− τ)|yi − x′β| (2)
where k is the number of explanatory variables, and τ represents the vector containing each
quantile. The vector of coefﬁcients β to be estimated will differ depending on the particular
quantile.
Using regression quantiles has certain analogies with approaches such as that of Basile and
Girardi (2010), who test the assumption of parameter homogeneity across geographic units
in measuring risk sharing. In our case, running the regressions for different quantiles (τ’s) is
equivalent, since the different values of τ refer to different values of the endogenous variable
(number of bank branches), which varies between municipalities.
Results for the quantile regression estimation are provided in Tables 6, 7 and 8 for
all banking ﬁrms (including credit unions), commercial banks, and savings banks, respec-
tively. These tables provide coefﬁcients and standard errors for selected quantiles (τ =
{.05,.10,.25,.50,.75,.90,.95}). Please note that the quantile τ = .5 refers to the median of the
conditional distribution. Whilst OLS regressionsreport regressionestimates based on the mean,
quantile regression based on τ = .5 provides an analogous result for a different moment of
the distribution—the median. Therefore, whereas in the median-regression model the condi-
tional .5th quantile is modeled as a function of covariates, quantile regression considers other
quantiles to describe noncentral positions of the distribution. The results in Tables 6 through 8
go further, reporting results not only for the median (τ = .5) but also for other quantiles and,
therefore, are more informative. We have also included Table 9 which reports information on
the statistical differences among the slope coefﬁcients for the different values of τ.
The informativeness of the results is further improved by Figures 4 through 6, which pro-
vide continuous counterparts to Tables 6–8—i.e., for all possible values of τ. Each plot in each
ﬁgure depicts one coefﬁcient of the quantile regression model (2). The dotted black line in each
plot represents the point estimates, { ˆ βj(τ) : j = 1,...,10}, with the shaded gray area depicting
90% pointwise conﬁdence band. Superimposed on each plot is a red line representing the OLS
estimate of the mean effect, with two dashed lines in red again representing a 90% conﬁdence
interval for this coefﬁcient. The solid line in black on each plot indicates the null effect (ˆ βj = 0)
and, therefore, when the area in grey does not overlap with the ˆ βj = 0 solid black line the
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
21
32Figure 4: Determinants of bank branch location, all banking ﬁrms, regression quantiles, 2008






































































































































































































Notes: The dotted black line in each subﬁgure represents the point estimates, { ˆ βj(τ) : j = 1,...,10}, with the shaded gray area depicting 90%
pointwise conﬁdence band. Superimposed on each plot is a red line representing the OLS estimate of the mean effect, with two dashed lines in
red again representing a 90% conﬁdence interval for this coefﬁcient. The solid line in black on each plot indicates the null effect (ˆ βj = 0) and,
therefore, when the area in grey does not overlap with the ˆ βj = 0 solid black line the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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33Figure 5: Determinants of bank branch location, commercial banks, regression quantiles, 2008


































































































































































































































































Notes: The dotted black line in each subﬁgure represents the point estimates, { ˆ βj(τ) : j = 1,...,10}, with the shaded gray area depicting 90%
pointwise conﬁdence band. Superimposed on each plot is a red line representing the OLS estimate of the mean effect, with two dashed lines in
red again representing a 90% conﬁdence interval for this coefﬁcient. The solid line in black on each plot indicates the null effect ( ˆ βj = 0) and,
therefore, when the area in grey does not overlap with the ˆ βj = 0 solid black line the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
4
3
34Figure 6: Determinants of bank branch location, savings banks, regression quantiles, 2008















































































































































































































































































Notes: The dotted black line in each subﬁgure represents the point estimates, { ˆ βj(τ) : j = 1,...,10}, with the shaded gray area depicting 90%
pointwise conﬁdence band. Superimposed on each plot is a red line representing the OLS estimate of the mean effect, with two dashed lines in
red again representing a 90% conﬁdence interval for this coefﬁcient. The solid line in black on each plot indicates the null effect ( ˆ βj = 0) and,
therefore, when the area in grey does not overlap with the ˆ βj = 0 solid black line the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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35Table 6: Determinants of bank branch location using quantile regression, all banking ﬁrms,
2008 (information at LAU level 2, formerly NUTS level 5)













































































































































Notes: the numbers represent coefﬁcients for the estimated linear quantile regression for each of the selected
quantiles (τ). Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed presuming local (in τ) linearity (in x) of the
conditional quantile functions and computes a Huber sandwich estimate using a local estimate of the sparsity.
See Koenker (2010) for further details.
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36Table 7: Determinants of bank branch location using quantile regression, commercial banks,
2008 (information at LAU level 2, formerly NUTS level 5)









































































































































































Notes: the numbers represent coefﬁcients for the estimated linear quantile regression for each of the selected
quantiles (τ). Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed presuming local (in τ) linearity (in x) of the
conditional quantile functions and computes a Huber sandwich estimate using a local estimate of the sparsity.
See Koenker (2010) for further details.
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37Table 8: Determinants of bank branch location using quantile regression, savings banks, 2008
(information at LAU level 2, formerly NUTS level 5)









































































































































































Notes: the numbers represent coefﬁcients for the estimated linear quantile regression for each of the selected
quantiles (τ). Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed presuming local (in τ) linearity (in x) of the
conditional quantile functions and computes a Huber sandwich estimate using a local estimate of the sparsity.
See Koenker (2010) for further details.
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38Table 9: ANOVA for testing the equality of the slope coefﬁcients for different quantiles (τ)
All banking ﬁrms Commercial banks Savings banks
F 9.5974 5.0740 5.9003
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: the null hypothesis being tested is whether the slope coefﬁcients
for the different values of τ are equal, for each type of banking aggre-
gate (all banking ﬁrms, commercial banks, or savings banks). Formally:
H0 : βτ=.05 = βτ=.10 = ... = βτ=.90 = βτ=.95
See Koenker (2010) for further details.
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39The plots in Figures 4–6 offer a much richer and focused view than the one we obtain
by looking exclusively at conditional mean models (Koenker, 2005, p.25). For instance, as
revealed by Figure 4b, the effect of foreign-born immigrants on service accessibility measured
as the number of bank ofﬁces in each municipality is 0.075, as indicated both in Table 5, Model
1, and the red solid line in Figure 4b. This is the average effect. The dotted black line in Figure
4b is far more informative, revealing that the effect is three times larger for the lower tail of the
distribution, i.e., for municipalities with few bank ofﬁces. This result also adds to the reported
evidence on the ﬁnancial exclusion of foreign-born communities.
The individual analyses for commercial banks (Figure 5b) and savings banks (Figure 6b)
clearly indicate that the banking ﬁrms contributing to ﬁnancial inclusion are savings banks.
Both Figure 5b and Table 7 show that the effect of this covariate on the number of ofﬁces is
only signiﬁcant for the lowest quantile (τ = 0.05). In contrast, the effect on the number of
savings banks’ branches is positive and signiﬁcant for all the quantiles considered, as revealed
by Table 8 and Figure 6b. As opposed to this ﬁndings considering the different types of ﬁrms
separately, the pattern for natives (Figures 4a, 5a and 6a) is more stable across the conditional
distribution.
The quantile regression results for the economic performance variables (UNEMPLOY) also
report some interesting ﬁndings compared to the OLS results. For instance, in the case of com-
mercial banks, the effect of unemployment (Figure 5c and Table 6) indicates that the negative
and signiﬁcant average impact yielded by OLS is corroborated for different quantiles of the
distribution, but, in the case of savings banks (Figure 6c and Table 8), the effect is either
non-signiﬁcant or, for the lower tail of the distribution, positive. This result was not revealed
by Table 5 suggesting, once more, that savings banks are contributing to ﬁnancial inclusion
and service accessibility for low-income communities much more decidedly than commercial
banks.
The economic activity variables (TRUCKS, IND_CONS, COMM_WHOLE,
COMM_RETAIL and TOURISM) clearly indicate that, for all banking ﬁrms, as shown
in Figures 4d–4h, and Table 6, OLS results miss relevant trends since, with perhaps the
exception of IND_CONS, the rest of the variables show a very different effect for the upper
and lower tails of the distribution.
For instance, TRUCKS was not signiﬁcant for the conditional-mean model (OLS), as re-
vealed by Model 1 in Table 5. However, both Table 6 and Figure 4d reveal this result does not
hold for the highest quantiles (τ = 0.90 and τ = 0.95), a result invisible for OLS. As suggested
22
40earlier, this could be related to the fact that some banking ﬁrms have a lack of presence in
rural areas, where this type of vehicles abound (this category also includes vans and tractors,
as suggested before). The behavior is very different for commercial banks and savings banks.
For the former, the impact is negative and signiﬁcant for all quantiles (Table 7 and Figure 5d),
whereas the impact is either not signiﬁcant or even positive (and signiﬁcant) for the highest
quantiles (Table 8 and Figure 6d) in the case of savings banks.
The rest of the economic variables (IND_CONS, COMM_WHOLE, COMM_RETAIL and
TOURISM) have expected signs for banks (they are positive and signiﬁcant throughout the
conditional distribution, as revealed by Table 6 and Figures 5e, 5f, 5g and 5h). However, this
result is not entirely mimicked for savings banks, for which the commercial activity variables
have a negative and signiﬁcant effect for some quantiles (see Table 8 and Figures 6f–6g). Again,
this might be related to the fact that savings banks do not take into account only economic con-
siderations when designing expansion policies but also would be pursuing objectives aimed at
helping to reduce ﬁnancial exclusion (p.107 Carbó et al., 2005).
These results are not as sharp when the analysis is performed for commercial banks and
savings banks separately. In the case of the environmental variable considered (DENSITY)
there is an opposite pattern, as in this case a speciﬁc analysis for commercial banks (Table
7 and Figure 5i) indicates that the (negative) effect is much larger for under-branched areas,
pointing out the relatively absence of commercial banks’ ofﬁces in rural areas.
Finally, the quantile regressionanalysis for the ﬁnancial variables also reveals some interest-
ing trends which OLS regressions could not uncover. Recall that the corresponding regressors
are lagged (they correspond to year 2007 information). In the case of savings banks, Table
8 and Figure 6j corroborate that the rival precedence behavior of these type of ﬁrms is a re-
ality. The new result uncovered by quantile regression is that the presence of savings bank
branches is especially remarkable in locations where the number of commercial bank branches
is higher; in contrast, as revealed by Table 8 and Figure 6k, in locations where there are more
savings bank branches, the presence of credit union branches is comparatively low, suggesting
a complementary role of savings banks and credit unions.
4. Conclusions
This paper has explored the determinants of bank branch location in Spain, with a special
focus on their implications for ﬁnancial exclusion. The issue is important for a number of
23
41reasons. While the reduction in branch numbers has been a dominant trend in many countries
over the last few years, in Spain, after the passing of the 1989 law which allowed savings
banks to branch freely across the entire country, the total number of bank branches increased
by 50%, and the number of savings bank branches increased in greater proportions, doubling
between 1988 (the year prior to deregulation) and 2008, a similar trend to that taking place
for credit unions. However, with the upsurge of the economic and ﬁnancial crisis which is
affecting many countries, the trend has reversed over the last two years. Savings banks and
credit unions have been closing branches, and this trend will probably intensify due to the
restructuring affecting savings banks.
These trends may be important for several reasons, one of the most signiﬁcant being that
they might affect the availability of ﬁnancial services in some communities. This issue has
been analyzed intensely by the literature on ﬁnancial exclusion. Our analysis has attempted
to explore it from different perspectives to those considered until now. With respect to some
previous studies focusing in the Spanish banking industry (notably Bernad et al., 2008), we
choose a broader perspective by enlarging the set of covariates, providing a separate analysis
for commercial banks, savings banks, and credit cooperatives, and performing the analysis for
a recent and relevant year (2008). The scant previous literature, especially in the European con-
text, considered arguments that considered less restrictive banking would result into improved
service accessibility. Yet, as indicated by Evanoff (1988), the links between bank branching and
service accessibility have been ultimately an empirical question.
For undertaking the analysis, we adopt a point of view which considers that the variables
affecting the number of branches in each municipality have not necessarily to remain constant
along the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. In other words, we consider that
it might be simplistic to postulate an average effect for the average municipality. In contrast, we
advocate for a more ﬂexible method, such as quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978;
Koenker, 2001), which enables the researcher to consider the entire distribution of location
patterns, whereas OLS considers only the distribution mean.
Our results can be explored from a multiplicity of angles. They corroborate previous ev-
idence, suggesting the main determinants of bank branch location are related to population
and income variables. We extend this general result in some ways. Firstly, we have added
several covariates to the model, and also split some of the variables already analyzed, which
enriched the available interpretations. Our ﬂexible techniques, which stipulate that the effect
of a given variable can be too intricate to be summarized in an average effect for the average
24
42municipality, added further insights to the results, since the effect of several variables was
different according to the tail of the distribution being examined.
In addition, when the analysis was split between the different types of ﬁnancial institutions
(commercial banks, savings banks and credit unions) results were particularly enriched. One
of the most interesting achievements is related to the fact that, although the three types of in-
stitutions are allowed to perform the same operations, substantial differences remain in some
particular areas, one of which affects bank branch location, service accessibility and, therefore,
their relative contributions to ﬁnancial inclusion. Although one of the consequences of the
recent international ﬁnancial and economic crisis in Spain has been the re-structuring of the
savings bank sector, with most of them now immerse in far-reaching merger processes, our
results indicate that this type of institution has greatly contributed to ﬁnancial inclusion in
Spain. The merger processes may be jeopardizing this notable role, as they will ultimately re-
sult in a much lower number of savings banks, whose regional links will be weaker. Therefore,
although the costs of not adopting the model proposed by Jack Revell (1989) might have been
high, restructuring the sector ignoring the ﬁnancial inclusion role played by savings banks
could also bring important costs.
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